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A Note on Lindahl Equilibria and the Core 
of a Game with a Crowded Public Good* 
by 
Mikio Nakayama 
1. This note considers the core of a game for an economy with a 
public good subject to crowding and its relationships to the Lindahl equilibria 
of that economy. Crowding means here that cost functions for providing the 
public good are nondecreasing with respect to a group of agents, namely 
its size, in which the public good is produced and consumed collectively 
excluding any of the nonmembers. This treatment of crowding is similar 
to that of Ellickson〔l],with which he presented examples that the Lindahl 
equilibrium does not belong to the core and that the core itself is empty, 
contrary to the assertion of Foley〔2]for the pure public good case. Crowd-
ing in this setting should involve a partition of agents into several “sharing 
groups”for the public good. Thus, in our game, players in each coalition 
are allowed to form a partition so as to maximize the net benefit of the 
coalition as a whole. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for 
the game to have anonempty core, and a sufficient condition in a special 
キ Thisis a revised version of the paper, A Note on the Core of a Game with 
a Crowded Public Good, Working Paper No. 10, Faculty of Economics, Toyama 
University, 1976. 
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case for the core to contain the Lindahl equilibria. 
2. Let N= {1，…，n} be the set of players. Every nonempty subset T 
of N can produce a public good, for which we shall consider crowding, and 
consume it collectively excluding any of the members in N-T. T might 
be called a sharing group for the public good. We will find it convenient 
later to look upon T as a kind of clubs of players that is quite free from 
any geographical interpretation. The benefit of player isN received from 
consuming q amount of the public good is given, in terms of money, by 
ui(q). We assume that u/q) is monotone increasing, concave, continuous 
and bounded from above for q(qミO). The cost of providing q amount of 
the public good in sharing group T is given by C(q, T). Here C(q, T) 
is a monotone nondecreasing function of TcN, i.e., TcR implies C(q, T) 
三五C(q,R). This means that the addition of another player to a sharing 
group (possibly) increases the resources required to maintain the level of 
the public good consumed in the group. Pure public goods are those for 
which crowding does not occur, that is, C(q, T) =C(q) for al TcN. We 
assume in addition that C(q, T) is increasing and linear in q(qミ0).
In this setting, a coalition of players may form a partition into several 
sharing groups so as to maximize the net benefit from the public good. 
Denote by TI (S) the collection of partitions of Sc N. Then we define the 
game ( N, v) as follows: 
where 
( max ~ B(T) for al nonempty ScN, 
v(S）口 ｛7Tell(S) Tm 
l 0 for S an empty set, 
(1) 
B(T) =max CI: ui(q)-C(q, T)). (2) 
qミ0 iεT 
The core of the game (N, v) is the set of payoff vectors b= (b1,-・・bρ 
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satisfying 
L: biミv(S)for al ScN, and L: bi三岳（N) (3) 
ieS ieN 
In Shapley and Shubik’s term in [7], the game (N, v) is“the least super-
additive majorant”of the game (N, B), where the function B is defined 
by (2) for al subsets of N. Thus the game (N, v) can be viewed as an 
example of the least superadditive majorant of games. For pure public goods 
it is clear that v(S) =B(S). Then the core of the game (N, v) is nonempty 
and contains the Lindahl equilibria (defined later), since our model is a 
special version of that of Foley [2〕. Kaneko [3] showed further that the 
game becomes the convex game in this pure public good case, which implies 
that the core is so large that it tells us almost nothing about the outcome 
the game would yield. However, as examples given by Ellickson [1] indicate, 
these properties are no longer true without any further condition if crowding 
is introduced. 
3. Let (N, v') be the game defined by 
(B(S) 
ザ（S)=iv(N) 
if S三N,
if S=N. 
Note that the game (N，ザ） may not be superadditive. 
Then we prove: 
Proposition 1. The game (N, v) has a nonempty core if and only if the 
game (N，ぜ） has a nonempty core. 
Proof. The “only if”part is clear since v'(S);;;;_v(S) for al ScN. Let 
ScN be an arbitrary coalition and let v(S) = L: B(T), where πis a parti-
Terr 
tion of S. Then if b= (b1，－・ん） belongs to the core of the game (N, v'), 
we have 
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り（S)=~ B(T）豆2 ~ bi＝~ bi. Q. E. D. 
TεπTε71' ieT teS 
It is wellknown that the core of a characteristic function game is nonempty 
if and ohly if the game is balanced, i. e., 
~ x5v(S）三玉v(N)for al （らと0:ScN} 
SCN 
such that L] X5=1 for al iεN. 
Sヨt
SCN 
Thus, Proposition 1 implies that the core of the game (N，り） is nonempty 
if and only if 
~ XTB(T）三五v(N)for al {xT孟0:TcN} 
TCN 
such that ~ XT = 1 for al ic N. 
Tヨi
TCN 
(4) 
To interpret the condition （引， letus suppose that the society N = {1，…，n} 
seeks for an optimal pattern of sharing under which the net benefit from 
consuming the public good is maximized. Following Littlechild [4], a 
fractional membership is also allowed as a possible pattern of sharing. That 
is, every player can join a sharing group T at a proportion of time indicated 
by the balancing weight XT・ In Li ttlechild’s terminology, T is “a part-time 
club" if勾ヂ1. When XT=l, Tis “a full-time club" in the sense that every 
player in T devotes al of his time to T. Then ~ XTB(T) is the net benefit 
T亡N
obtained when each player participates each sharing group T fractionally XT 
amount of time. Thus condition (4) for the nonempty core states that 
the maximal net benefit over al possible pattern of sharing including such 
fractional memberships must be attained under a partition of N so that each 
player participates fully in a particular sharing group. In other words, any 
sharing pattern involving part-time clubs must not be optimal. 
4. Next, we consider the relationship between the core and Lindahl 
equilibria in this economy. Let πbe a partition of N. Then the Lindahl 
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equilibrium is the triplet 〈ρ＊； qヘ； π〉＝（ρ＊1，…ρ九； q*T1＂・，q*Tm; Tl，… Tm) 
such that for each Tεπ， 
and 
Ui(q*T）一ρ＊；q*T=max(ui(qi)-p/q,) for al iεT, 
QiミO
I; P*iq*T-C(q*T,T) =max ( I; Pちqー C(q,T)). 
ieT q孟0 ieT 
In view of Ellickson's nonpathological examples indicating that the 
Lindahl equilibrium is not contained in the core, it seems unsnccessful even 
in this simple framework to investigate generally the conbition for the core 
to contain the Lindahl equilibrium. Rather, we shall limit to the case where 
formation of sharing groups across the optimal partition of N is not advan-
tageous. Let v(N) = I; B(T*). We assume that 
T勺r
I; B(T*nT）三B(T) for al TcN. (5) 
T勺π
Under this assumption sharing groups acrossπwould not form since it does 
no better than stay in each T*. Let the cost function C(q, T) be given by 
C(q, T) =aTq, aT>O for each TcN. 
Then we prove: 
Proposition 2. Under assumption (5), the Lindahl equilibrium (p*; q＊＂；π〉
belongs to the core of the game (N，め if
I; P＊；三玉aT fo.i al TcN. (6) 
iεT 
Proof. Let αi=ui(q*r心－P*iq＊戸 ificT*, and let B(R) =I; ui(qR)-C(qR, R) 
ieR 
for RcN arbitrary fixed. By Proposition 1 it suffices to show that I;尚三三
ieT 
B(T) for al T三N,I;尚三三v(N). The latter is clear. By the definition 
ieN 
of the Lindahl equilibrium and condition (6), we have 
Zαi= I; I; (ui(q*T*)-p*iq*T•) 
ieT T＊ε’TC・ieT「IT*
と2 I; (ui(qTnr•)-p*;qTnT*) 
T＊ε’r ieT「lT*
= I; ( I; Ui(qT「1T*)- E P*iC(qTnT内 Tn T*)/aTnT•) 
T＊επiεTnT* ieTnT* 
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とL:CL: U;(qT「1T*)-C(qTnT*,TηT*)) 
T～r ieTnT* 
= L: B(TnT*) 
T＊επ 
三B(T). Q. E. D. 
Thus assumption (6) together with the condition that the sum of the 
Lindahl prices pへneverexceeds the marginal cost of production for the 
public good in any sharing group assures the Lindahl equilibrium to be in 
the core of the game (N, v). The result for a pure public good follows 
immediately from π＝｛N} and 勿 ＝aNfor al TcN. 
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